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Justice Denied? An Analysis of the Difficulties Facing Applicants for Prohibition in Delayed Prosecutions for Child Sexual Abuse​[1]​

I	Introduction
Child sexual abuse is a crime characterised by secrecy. Feelings of misplaced guilt and shame often prevent the victim from making a complaint to the police. Until recently, the fear of reporting was compounded by society’s disbelief of victims. Since the mid-1990s, Ireland has experienced a surge in the number of prosecutions for child sexual abuse, most of which involve abuse that is alleged to have occurred decades earlier. Such cases continue to feature routinely in the criminal courts. Lengthy lapses of time between the alleged offence and reporting present huge challenges to the criminal process, which must vindicate the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial while also seeking to prosecute these most serious of allegations. 
This article considers the issue of complainant delay​[2]​ in prosecutions for child sexual abuse. The focus is on the case law of the High Court and the Supreme Court in applications brought by defendants seeking to have their trials prohibited on the grounds of prejudice caused by the delay. These prohibition applications present the courts with an invidious dilemma; how to ensure the defendant is not put at risk of an unfair trial, while at the same time recognising that delay in reporting is a common feature in many child sexual abuse cases, particularly where there is familial relationship between the abuser and the victim. 
The organisation of this article is as follows: first the development of the Superior Courts’ approach to delay is briefly set out, from the development of a fault-based tripartite test to the institution of a simplified, actual prejudice-based test in the case of S.H. v. DPP.​[3]​ This is followed by a detailed analysis of recent cases, the effect of which has been to narrow considerably the parameters for successful prohibition applications. Finally, the issue of jury directions is considered in an examination of relevant case law emanating from the Court of Criminal Appeal. It is hoped that in this way practitioners will gain an insight into current issues in applications for prohibition in delayed prosecutions for child sexual abuse.

II	Delay
(a)	What’s the problem with delay? The right to a trial with reasonable expedition
Although there is no express constitutional right to a speedy trial, the courts have interpreted Article 38.1 to include an entitlement to a trial with reasonable expedition.​[4]​ The rationale is that delay in the institution of proceedings can seriously prejudice the accused person in the preparation of his defence; witnesses die or move away; documentary and material evidence is destroyed or lost. Particularly in cases of lengthy delay, witnesses’ memories will have faded. The danger is that the defendant may be faced with the situation of having to defend himself against serious charges in circumstances where corroborative or exculpatory evidence is simply no longer available, or worse, cannot be remembered. Furthermore, delay can mean that the prejudice to the defence cannot always be demonstrated:

“… the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defence witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.”​[5]​

Therefore, delays of decades are usually held to violate the accused’s right to due process and right to a trial with reasonable expedition. 

(b)	Applications for prohibition on the grounds of delay
Delayed prosecutions for child sexual abuse feature lapses of time so great that, in any other sort of case, the delay would of itself preclude prosecution.​[6]​ However, historic child sexual abuse cases have been found to involve special considerations so that delayed reporting is not an automatic bar to prosecution. In historic child sexual abuse cases, the accused can apply to the High Court by way of judicial review for an order prohibiting the continued prosecution of the charges. The onus of proof lies on the applicant and the standard to be reached is the balance of probabilities.​[7]​ The prohibition remedy is used because unlike in other common law jurisdictions, such as England, a trial judge does not have jurisdiction to hear an application to stay or to quash an indictment on the grounds of delay. ​[8]​ 

(c)	The Delay Jurisprudence
From the first delayed prosecutions for child sexual abuse, the courts emphasised that these cases involved a unique set of issues and considerations that set them apart from other kinds of criminal prosecutions. The decisions illustrate a growing recognition that victims of child sexual abuse often suffer from feelings of fear and shame, particularly where their abuser is a family member. It was in this context that the courts stressed that an accused should not be allowed to benefit from the delay in reporting. Indeed the applicant’s role in causing the delay was relevant to the decision as to whether or not the trial should be prohibited.

(i)	B. v. DPP and P.C. v. DPP: Dominion and Balancing
From B. v. DPP​[9]​ onwards, prosecutions that were unstateable under the previous law came before the courts. B. was charged in 1993 with indecent assault and rape offences alleged to have been committed against three of his daughters 20 and 30 years earlier. Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, Denham J held that prima facie, the delay was an “inordinate lapse of time”.​[10]​ However, this case belonged to special category of cases, which involved allegations of child sexual abuse. The court would balance the applicant’s rights with the community’s right to have the offences prosecuted. If the applicant ran the real risk of an unfair trial, then on balance, the applicant’s right to a fair trial would prevail.​[11]​ In attempting to balance the community’s right to prosecute with the rights of the accused, the court would inquire as to the reasons for the delay in reporting. Any presumed prejudice arising out of the lengthy delay in reporting was to be balanced by not only by the absence of proven actual prejudice, but the court would also consider the extent to which the delay was due to the conduct of the accused. In B. the delay was justified by the dominion exercised by the applicant over the three complainants.​[12]​ 
Crucially, the Court’s reasoning as to the justifications for the delay in B was premised on an assumption that the complaint was true. This approach prompted McGuinness J. to sound a note of caution in P.C. v. DPP.​[13]​ The applicant was a coach driver and a swimming teacher at a school. The time lapse between the alleged offences and reporting was 13 years. Having examined the automatic disbelief of all sexual complainants in the past, McGuinness J. noted that it would be “equally unfortunate if the discredited orthodoxy of the past were replaced by an equally right orthodox view that in all cases of delay … the delay can automatically be negatived by dominion.”​[14]​ On appeal to the Supreme Court Keane C.J. set out a tripartite test to be applied:
1.  The court must decide whether, depending on the nature of the charges, the delay was such that despite the absence of actual prejudice, the trial should be prohibited.
 2. What were the reasons for the delay and whether, assuming the complaint to be true, the delay in making it was referable to the accused’s conduct.
3. Whether the accused had suffered actual prejudice such that the trial should not be allowed to proceed. At this stage, the presumption of innocence would apply.​[15]​
Since the applicant was unable to show actual specific prejudice, the order of prohibition was quashed. The P.C. test centred on the assignment of fault; could the victim’s reasons for delay have been caused by the applicant’s actions? Crucially it involved an assumption as to the veracity of the complaint. Not only was this inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, it also was unnecessary, since it engaged the court in a fact-finding process that ultimately did not shed any light on whether or not the trial would be unfair. The reasons for the victim’s delay in reporting were irrelevant to the third part of the test, the decision as to fairness. The P.C. test was indicative of the Court’s desire to incorporate the victim’s experiences into the decision making process, unfortunately however at the expense of a fairness-based approach.

(ii)	A New Test:	S.H. v. DPP
The Supreme Court signalled a shift in its approach to delay in the case of S.H. v. DPP.​[16]​ The applicant was a primary school teacher who was charged in 2001 with 50 counts of indecent assault against minors that were alleged to have been committed 40 years earlier. Formal complaints were not made until 1999. The appeal came on for hearing before three judges, but having heard submissions, the appeal was adjourned for hearing before a court of five. Murray C.J., giving the judgment of the Court, held that judicial knowledge of issues relating to dominion, inhibition, disparity between the ages of the accused and the complainant and other issues relating to reasons why a complainant might delay, was now well established. It was no longer necessary for the court to inquire into the reasons for the delay or whether the accused had exercised dominion over the complainant or to make assumptions as to the truth of the complaints. Therefore any assumption of the truth of the complaints no longer arises.   
Murray C.J. set out the new test to be applied in applications for prohibition on the grounds of delay. The test to be applied is now solely prejudice-based: the applicant must show on the balance of probabilities that the delay in reporting has resulted in prejudice so as to give rise to a real and serious risk of an unfair trial. The Court also retained a residual jurisdiction to grant an order of prohibition in exceptional circumstances, where it would be unfair or unjust to put an accused on trial.
The decision in S.H.​[17]​ abolished the exercise of attributing and apportioning blame for the delay in reporting. The removal of the fault-based test is a welcome development, since it was at odds with the presumption of innocence and was not relevant to the decision regarding fairness. However, it is clear that the courts are reluctant to grant orders of prohibition​[18]​ and applicants seeking to prohibit their trial on charges often many decades old face an extremely difficult battle.

III	How to Show Prejudice? The Post-S.H. Cases: Themes and Issues
Since the decision in S.H., the standard to be reached by applicants seeking an order of prohibition is very high indeed. The issue of presumptive prejudice arising from the delay of itself will not normally be enough, the courts preferring instead to rely on the trial court’s power to guarantee due process.​[19]​ Furthermore, applicants must show that the risk of an unfair trial is such that it cannot be avoided by appropriate rulings and directions by the trial judge.​[20]​ A remote, fanciful or purely theoretical form of prejudice is not sufficient.​[21]​ It is now essential to fully and actively engage with the facts of the particular case in order to establish whether the accused’s ability to defend proceedings has been fatally compromised.
Defence practitioners bringing applications for prohibition in historic child sexual abuse cases must therefore be particularly alert to the dangers posed by delay. The problems caused by time’s erosion of evidence are twofold. First, the disappearance or destruction of material evidence such as records or files, or the deterioration of witnesses’ memories, can mean that the defendant is unable to test the case against him. In such a situation there exists no “island of fact” against which the credibility of the complainant and other witnesses may be tested. 
The second problem caused by the disappearance of evidence is that both the disappearance and the prejudice caused thereby are notoriously difficult to demonstrate. While the courts are more than willing to engage with the facts of the case, defence practitioners can be placed in the catch-22 situation of having to show how they are prejudiced by the lack of something that is no longer available to use. If the evidence was available to use the defendant would perhaps not be as prejudiced by the passage of time, since time has not affected the evidence available. The problem is that in the absence of demonstrable prejudice, the reviewing Court will be more likely to presume that the defendant is not prejudiced and will allow the trial to proceed.
The following cases illustrate the serious difficulties facing applicants trying to show prejudice since the decision in S.H.

(a)	High threshold of actual prejudice
(i) 	Disappearance of an Island of Fact
As noted above, the principal difficulty facing defendants in delayed prosecutions for child sexual abuse is that evidence, witnesses and witnesses’ memories have disappeared over time. If the trial had taken place within a year or two of the alleged abuse, the complaint would have been more detailed, and witnesses and evidence would most likely still be available. Prejudice can result where the complainant makes reference to specific details relating to the circumstances or timing of the offences, but the passage of time has resulted in the destruction of relevant evidence that could have been used to undermine the complainant’s account. The defendant is therefore unable to contest a particular island of fact due to the disappearance of evidence or witnesses:

“If a person, who is innocent, is confronted with an allegation of this sort, he can only hope to counteract it, in practical terms, if he can show that the complainant has previously made false or improbable allegations of the same kind against himself or another person or if he can contradict the complainant on some important matter of fact. This, I think is the universal experience of those who have prosecuted or defended such cases. […] The position of a person, who is innocent in fact, but whose defence can consist only of a bare denial (just as the complainants may consist of an unsupported assertion) is very perilous.”​[22]​





 	P.O’C. v. DPP concerned a complaint made 14 years after the alleged offences.​[23]​ Significantly, the complainant graphically described how the applicant would lock the door of a room before committing the offences. McGuinness J. in the High Court found that because the applicant was the child’s music teacher and knew the boy’s parents and because of the expert evidence given, the delay was clearly referable to the accused’s own actions. However, the charges were more specific than in most sexual abuse trials. Most importantly, details relating to the locks and keys of the music room doors would have been clear in the memory of the applicant and his colleagues had the charges been brought sooner. However, the evidence of this had clearly disappeared. If it were possible to demonstrate that the complainant's account of the locking of the doors was untrue then the credibility of the complainant's entire account of the incident could be seriously undermined. Therefore, McGuinness J. held that there was specific prejudice to the accused in the preparation of his defence.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Keane C.J. applied the test set down in P.C.​[24]​ and found that the delay in reporting was explicable by reference to the accused’s actions, assuming them to be true. This was because of the disparity of ages and the teacher/pupil relationship, coupled with the uncontradicted evidence of the clinical psychologist. The Court then went on to consider the question of specific prejudice. The applicant’s solicitor had placed before the Court material that went beyond a bald assertion of prejudice. Indeed there was evidence that when enquiries were made of the director of the college at the time, he stated “details such as those you seek constitute the minutiae that fade from memory simply because they seem of no particular import at the time.”​[25]​ Had the trial taken place within a reasonable time, there would have been little difficulty in testing the accuracy of the complainant's version of events. The prosecution’s appeal was not allowed.
Practitioners should note that from an examination of the cases decided since S.H. v DPP, it would appear that the Courts have adopted a stricter approach to arguments based on the disappearance of islands of fact. Indeed it is far from clear that had P.O’C. been decided under the S.H. test the order of prohibition would have been granted.

C.K. v DPP 
An interesting case where the disappearance of an island of fact argument was rejected is C.K. v. DPP.​[26]​  Counsel for the applicant argued specific prejudice on a number of grounds. First, part of the complaint contained assertions that the applicant’s wife suffered repeated physical violence. Both the applicant and his wife applicant denied this. Counsel for the applicant argued that the since deceased family doctor would have seen the applicant’s wife on a number of occasions while she was pregnant, and that his evidence could have been used to test the credibility of the complainant. The applicant further submitted that the prosecution’s case centred on the allegation that the applicant drove a blue van and had assaulted the complainant in it. He argued that the destruction of the van in a fire and the subsequent loss of insurance records relating the ownership of the vehicle meant that he had suffered prejudice. In addition, the complainant alleged that some of the offences took place while the applicant was babysitting her. The applicant denied that he regularly babysat the complainant and asserted that the complainant’s grandmother had taken care of the children when the complainant’s parents were out. The applicant asserted that the death of the complainant’s grandmother meant that he could not put her version of events to the jury. Finally, the complainant alleged that one offence took place in a particular field. The applicant asserted that he could only access this field with the permission of the owner, and that the owner was deceased.
Counsel for the applicant asserted that the absence of this oral and documentary evidence deprived the applicant of certain ‘islands of fact’ upon which reliance could otherwise be placed by the defence to test the reliability of the complainant’s account. It was submitted that such prejudice could not be overcome by directions or rulings at trial. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. There was no evidence that the applicant’s wife ever consulted the doctor during the period in question. In addition, the applicant’s wife had asserted in her statement of proposed evidence that the complainant’s allegations regarding the beatings were incorrect. In relation to the blue van, the complainant had not made any allegation regarding its colour. Furthermore, in the course of an interview with gardaí the applicant had admitted that he had a blue van during the relevant period. This was later denied in his affidavit to the Court. However the garda evidence and affidavit in relation to what was said at the interview had not been challenged in cross-examination. The Court held that it was an issue to be teased out at trial. In relation to the complainant’s deceased grandmother, the court held that she could have had little or nothing to say on what babysitting arrangements were in place when she was not present.  Equally, in relation to the field there was no evidence that the gate was ever locked or that access to it could only be obtained by way of the owner. Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no evidential basis sufficient to justify the prohibition of the trial.

 (ii)	Attempts should be made to locate alternative evidence
The difficulties presented by the disappearance of islands of fact are further compounded by a requirement that applicants must show not only that relevant witnesses or evidence have disappeared, but also that there are no other alternative witnesses or evidence available instead. Practitioners should demonstrate that serious attempts have been made to locate alternative witnesses and evidence. 
In P.O’C. v. DPP (2008),​[27]​ a case that involved a delay of 16 years, the loss of the applicant's training diaries and the death of two relevant witnesses was not enough to establish actual prejudice. The Court also noted the applicant’s failure to enquire of the body responsible for the training session as to records of the team members in order to establish the whereabouts of other athletes who would have been involved in the training sessions. In J.K. v. DPP ​[28]​ the applicant relied on both complainant and prosecutorial delay as a result of which firstly it was impossible to trace the applicant’s work records which might have been relevant and secondly a person who could have been a material witness was then deceased and who might have been in a position to vouch the applicant’s whereabouts during the course of the evening in question. However, the Supreme Court held that on the evening in question there was a family christening with a gathering of the family circle and so it was unlikely that other witnesses as to the applicant’s behaviour on that occasion would not be available. 
  	The burden on the applicant may be heavier where the abuse is alleged to have occurred in an institutional setting. In D.D. v. DPP,​[29]​ which concerned eleven counts of abuse alleged to have been perpetrated against six pupils in an industrial school, the applicant argued actual prejudice on a number of grounds: his recollection of events was no longer clear; the death of several potential witnesses; the disappearance of documentary records concerning a broken window mentioned in one complaint; the death of a pertinent witness who could have given evidence as to whether or not the defendant had access a room where some of the offences were alleged to have taken place; and the demolition of particular school buildings where certain offences were alleged to have taken place. However the Supreme Court held that the applicant had not gone far enough; the nature of the offences was they occurred in secret. Any evidence which the deceased witnesses could have given would at best have been peripheral. Central to the Court’s decision was the applicant’s failure to indicate whether any of the evidence that the three deceased witnesses would have given was available from any other source:

“The applicant has not engaged with the circumstances of the case in that he has not indicated whether any of the evidence which the three deceased witnesses would give is available from some other source. In a case such as the present where the community of the Christian Brothers was presumably numerous and the residents of the industrial school ever more numerous, the appellant ought at least to have recounted his efforts to obtain such evidence as he might wish to adduce from other sources.”​[30]​

Neither had he made any attempt to obtain witnesses who could give evidence regarding the layout of the demolished buildings.
Unfortunately for defendants the kind of details volunteered in the foregoing cases is rare. If the complainant fails to offer specific information regarding the circumstances of the alleged offence(s) it is extremely difficult to show that the defence is prejudiced. Indeed, as Hardiman J. has noted, a person in whose case there is an ‘island of fact’ is perhaps, ironically, both in a potentially better position to face a trial (because evidence may not, after all, prove irretrievable) and in a better position to demonstrate prejudice in an application for prohibition. By contrast a person who cannot point to any island of fact is in what he called “a very perilous position at a trial” ​[31]​ (because of the risks associated with a pure contest of credibility) and in addition is unable on a prohibition application to show any prejudice to his defence.
(b) Applicant must demonstrate failure of memory
The nature of the prejudice suffered must also be demonstrated to be extremely serious. In J.T. v. DPP​[32]​ a case involving allegations of abuse dating back almost 40 years, counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant, a former Christian Brother, was depressed and had suffered grave pre-trial anxiety as a result of vilification in the media. However, this was not sufficient to halt the trial. The Supreme Court noted that an important factor in its decision was that the applicant had received medical care but had not submitted a medical report. The negative publicity had occurred four to six years previously. The applicant also deposed that he could only recollect four of the fifteen complainants. Indeed, his police interviews were “littered with references to his inability to remember persons and circumstances.”​[33]​ However the Supreme Court held that the evidence relating to the applicant’s memory was vague and ambiguous and there was no medical evidence on the issue. The Court refused the applicant’s appeal.
The Supreme Court also refused the applicant’s appeal against a refusal of an order of prohibition in S.A. v. DPP.​[34]​ In that case, the applicant was accused of multiple offences of a sexual nature allegedly perpetrated while he was a Christian Brother working the former Artane industrial school. The applicant faced eight allegations of buggery, 63 of indecent assault and one charge of attempted buggery. The oldest charge dated back 46 years and the latest dated back 38 years earlier. The trial judge held that the delay “could not rationally be considered to be anything other than inordinate”. The Supreme Court in disallowing the appeal, held that there were certain features of the case which mitigated the effect of the long periods of delay in the case.  First, the applicant had given extensive interviews to the gardaí and these appeared to demonstrate that the applicant’s memory was functioning and accurate, and that he showed “a marked instinct for precision”. Furthermore, during the course of the interviews, the applicant made certain admissions relating to acts that were “in the nature of inappropriate touching”. The applicant was alleged to have said that these incidents occurred “in moments of human weakness” and that “if the boys have said this, he must accept it, but that he has no recollection of it. He must accept what they have said on trust. His memory is not as good as it used to be…something must have taken place.” He also said that he remembered two complainants and he made specific admissions of conduct in relation to one boy. The Court held that “[h]is admissions are at least open to the interpretation that he also concedes conduct of this sort with other, unnamed boys.” The applicant could not say how often he experienced “moments of weakness” and did not know if he had behaved in a similar way with other boys. The Court held that despite the general nature of the admissions, the fact that they did not extend to buggery; and the fact that the statements all related to boys and made no mention of the female complainant, these admissions were still a significant factor. Therefore, the Court held that the inability to recall specific children by name was not gravely prejudicial to the defence. While admissions would greatly vary in their significance in prohibition applications, so that an unrecorded and disputed allegation may be of little or no significance unless its terms or context make it very compelling, and a disputed allegation of admission to gardaí will normally be verified by recording, this case was different. The admissions did not appear to have been denied or glossed so it was reasonable to take them at face value. The applicant’s appeal was refused. Practitioners should note that this was a case of undisputed admissions; the Court specifically distinguished it from cases where alleged admissions are hotly disputed and not independently verified.
In W.M. v. DPP,​[35]​ which involved charges dating back 28 years, the Supreme Court considered, inter alia, pre-charge correspondence between the applicant’s and the complainant’s solicitors, in which the applicant denied the allegations and eventually issued proceedings for defamation. A statement contained in this correspondence, stating that the applicant would vigorously defend any future criminal prosecution, should one be brought, was taken to constitute evidence that the applicant by his own admission could not be prejudiced by reason of the delay: “Crucially and centrally, […] is the fact that the applicant, effectively, through his own mouth, makes it abundantly clear that he has not been prejudiced in any way as a result of the significant delay which has undoubtedly taken place.”​[36]​
Another interesting development is McC. v. DPP.​[37]​ The applicant was charged with eight counts of sexual assault against his daughter, between July 1993 and December 1995 and one count of unlawful carnal knowledge against his daughter on a date unknown in 1993. A formal complaint was not made until October 2001.  In the course of an interview with gardaí, the applicant had alleged his brother had witnessed a conversation between the applicant and the complainant in which the complainant admitted the falsity of the allegations. The applicant argued that the death of his brother in 2002 constituted prejudice to his defence such that he ran the real and serous risk of an unfair trial. In the course of the judgment the Court made reference to the fact that “the [applicant] must show that the complainant unduly and unreasonably delayed in making her complaint if he is able to rely on it in combination with the prejudice he alleges.” It is suggested that this statement is inconsistent with the Court’s decision in S.H. that the reasons for the delay are no longer relevant. However, the Court in McC. did not dwell on this point, since the applicant had not contended that the evidence of inhibition was insufficient to justify the delay. The crux of the Court’s decision related to the issue of the deceased witness. The Court held that the alleged important piece of evidence did not come into existence until almost the end of that period. In addition it was far from clear that the applicant could point to any real prejudice. Furthermore the applicant’s account of the conversation could be put to garda witness and the complainant in cross-examination at trial. In was in this context that the Court held that the applicant’s biggest problem was that there was “no causal link between the complainant’s alleged delay and the loss of this piece of evidence.” It would therefore appear that the main reason for the Court’s decision was that the missing piece of evidence only arose towards the end of the delay period. It is not clear why the Court would attach less weight to a prejudice that arises at the end of delay period as opposed to a prejudice that accrues at a time nearer the commission of the alleged offence. It is suggested that there is no relation between when the prejudice accrued and its prejudicial effect on the applicant’s ability to present his defence.
 
(c)	Exceptional Circumstances 
The Supreme Court in S.H. retained a residual discretion to grant an order of prohibition in exceptional circumstances where it would be unfair to proceed with the prosecution. Such exceptional circumstances were found to be present in P.T. v. DPP​[38]​ where a number of factors, including the fact that the applicant was an elderly man of 86 years of age and in bad health, meant that in order to protect the integrity of the justice system the trial should be prohibited. Nevertheless, bad health and age will not always be sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances. In J.K. v. DPP​[39]​ the applicant was 84 years old. There was evidence that due to his increasing age and physical and mental disability the applicant would be unable to understand the nature of the charges against him and would be unable to deal with cross examination and was in general unfit to stand trial. It was not accepted by the Supreme Court that his age and health problems amounted to wholly exceptional circumstances as referred to in S.H. It was stressed that the ability of the applicant to stand trial was effectively a matter for the trial judge. A similar attitude was taken in D.T v. DPP​[40]​ where the Supreme Court held that the issue of capacity and fitness to plead is a matter for the trial judge, and that the High Court had erred in making a determination regarding the “alleged cognitive impairment” of the applicant. 
However, the exceptional circumstances test is not limited to the ailments of the applicant. In M.G. v. DPP​[41]​ the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal and granted the order of prohibition, based on a finding that the complainant was attempting to use the criminal courts as an instrument of blackmail, in order to extract money from the accused. The Court noted “a singular distinguishing feature” of the case, and that was that the complainant “persistently and repeatedly resorted to threats, combined with demands for money, of exposure of the Appellant’s sexual proclivities. He ultimately resorted to a physical attack on the Appellant’s property. These threats were combined with offers to withdraw charges in consideration of money payments.” The Court held that “[I]t redounds to the credit of the Appellant that, although he was clearly vulnerable to allegations of this type, he never paid or offered to pay anything as the price of the complainant’s silence.”​[42]​
The reviewing Court will have regard to the effect of cumulative factors, which on their own might not justify a prohibition order, but taken together, would justify the making of an order. In D.S. v. Judges of the Circuit Court and the DPP​[43]​ the Supreme Court found that the cumulative effect of a number of factors, including the Court’s duty to protect due process; the fact that the proceedings had been before the courts in one form or another for six years, and the issue of the severance of the charges, activated this “interest of justice” jurisdiction.
Exceptional circumstances were also found in C. (a minor) v. DPP,​[44]​ which was not a child sexual abuse case, but rather concerned summary proceedings for arson against a minor. Some prosecutorial delay had exacerbated the applicant’s vulnerable state. Dunne J in the High Court held that the emotional and mental vulnerability of the applicant meant that the case came with the wholly exceptional circumstances test established in S.H so that it would be unfair or unjust to put her on trial. However it should be noted that this case is more relevant to the issue of prosecutorial delay.​[45]​

IV	Unavoidable Unfairness of Trial: Directions to the Jury
In prohibition applications practitioners must show that the prejudice to the applicant is not only such that the defendant runs the real and serious risk of an unfair trial, but also that the prejudice is irremediable.​[46]​ Only if he succeeds in both respects is the defendant entitled to an order.​[47]​ The Supreme Court has reiterated its awareness of the dangers involved in a trial of historic child sexual abuse and has emphasised that these dangers are best dealt with by directions and rulings from the trial judge, “who has the opportunity to see and hear observe witnesses and will guard against an unfair trial.”​[48]​ However, the Courts in prohibition applications have not dealt with this issue in any great detail. It is therefore useful to consider the case law emanating from the Court of Criminal Appeal on directions by trial judges in delay cases. 
 	In DPP v E.C.​[49]​ the Court of Criminal Appeal allowed an appeal against conviction and ordered a retrial for various offences of unlawful carnal knowledge and indecent assault and one count of rape, against a total of four complainants. The Court held that the trial judge had failed to issue an appropriate warning to the jury on the issue of delay. The issue of delay had been dealt with as a preliminary matter and counsel had failed to direct the judge’s attention to the requirement to give a warning. The Court held that the omission of the warning went to “a central and critical aspect of this whole case”. The Court placed emphasis on two factors apart from the issue of delay simpliciter: the fact that there were a number of complaints and various complainants; and the fact that some of the complainants were very young at the time of the alleged offences was a factor which of itself would suggest the requirement for a warning.
The Court refused to set out warning which should have been given, but held that there were some elements of corroboration that were present which would dictate the nature the warning to be given. For example, the system described by the various complainants was very similar, and the applicant admitted being present in the Savoy cinema with one of the complainants when an offence was alleged to have occurred. 
In DPP v C.C.​[50]​ the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the appellant’s conviction for 180 counts of indecent assault and ordered a retrial. The delay ranged from 28 to 37 years. The case involved six complainants who alleged abuse over a nine-year period when the appellant was their primary school teacher. The appellant was convicted of abusing the complainants during class time in front of a classroom of pupils. Two of the complainants had no memory of the abuse when they were initially approached by gardaí. Counsel for the appellant argued a number of grounds of appeal, including the failure to sever the indictment, however the Court confined its decision to the issues of the warning to the jury on the impact of the delay on the complainants. The Court held that the prejudice caused by delay in the case of a single complainant “can only be seen as exponentially magnified where there are multiple complainants and a single accused. His difficulties of recollection, his difficulties in finding witnesses, or of even remembering the identity of individual complainants are all magnified in direct relation to the number of complainants who come forward. So, while the difficulties of delay may in such circumstances recede to some degree from the prosecution’s point of view, they are multiplied and exaggerated from a defendant’s point of view.”
Quashing the conviction, the Court held that the trial judge should have dwelt “at some length” on the difficulties facing a defendant in old cases, particularly where no complaints were made in the aftermath of the offences and where there were few islands of fact which would enable a defendant to address his mind in a specific way to the presence or otherwise of “certain physical arrangements or features of the environment in which it is alleged the various offences took place.” 
On a number of occasions,​[51]​ the Court of Criminal Appeal has approved the warning given by Haugh J. in the High Court in The People (DPP) v. R.B.​[52]​ Running to some 100 lines, it warns of the dangers of a contest of credibility, particularly when there is a lack of detail in the complaints due to the delay. Haugh J.’s warning specifically notes that the prejudice to the defence caused by delay is much greater than the prejudice caused to the prosecution, when memories have deteriorated: “… [T]o prosecute it is easier if you do not nail your colours to the mast because there is less you can be cross-examined on.” This dictum is very similar in tenor to the remarks made by Hardiman J. regarding the prejudice caused by allegations that do not contain any island of fact.​[53]​ However, the R.B. warning does not go far enough; as Hardiman J. has noted,​[54]​ it simply points out the dangers, without offering advice on how to act on them. Indeed, Hardiman J. has suggested that the dangers associated with failure of memory, even in trained professionals, should perhaps form the basis of a specific warning to be given in all historic child sexual abuse cases.​[55]​ Such a warning could be similar to the so-called Casey warning which is given in relation to visual identification.​[56]​
More detailed guidance from the Superior Courts on how to deal with such issues and others arising from delay in reporting, would be useful, particularly given the practical difficulties facing trial judges in warning jurors about the dangers presented by delay. Since jurors must try the case only on what evidence is laid before them, there are serious challenges for the trial judge in trying to formulate a suitable direction on how to incorporate the fact of delay into their deliberations. There are no common law or statutory rules that permit a judge to rule evidence inadmissible merely because it is old. There is no rule that requires a trial judge to caution the jury as to the delay between the commission of the alleged offences and the trial. Neither is there a requirement that the jury be cautioned on the dangers of convicting on the basis of uncorroborated testimony. Furthermore, the attempt to warn might well “degenerate into circularity”.​[57]​ While the judge may warn of the dangers posed to the defence by the lapse of time, she might also warn the jury of the possibility of the delay being a result of the abuse, thereby rendering the warning meaningless in terms of helping the jury in their deliberations and reducing the risk of injustice. Even more worrying is the risk of going too far and inviting the jury to try the case on what the evidence might have been, had the case been tried earlier.




The prohibition case law in historic childhood sexual abuse prosecutions exemplifies the common law’s ability to adapt and change in accordance with the needs of society. It also reflects a willingness on the part of the courts to accommodate victims’ reasons for delayed reporting and the need to prosecute serious crime despite problems posed by lapse of time. However, historic childhood sexual abuse prosecutions continue to pose serious challenges to the criminal process. The risks of injustice associated with any trial of the credibility of the witnesses are compounded where the passage of time may have destroyed material evidence and relevant witnesses may have disappeared. The shift from a fault-based to a prejudice-based test has sidelined arguments relating to the prejudice caused by the passage of time in itself. Arguably this has resulted in a lack of adequate consideration of the enormous task facing trial judges in trying to ensure due process. In light of the serious difficulties facing defendants in trying to show how they may have been prejudiced by the delay in reporting, and in light of the risk that an eventual trial may amount to bare assertion countered by bare denial, there is a need for trial judges to have appropriate directions and warnings at their disposal in order to ensure the due process rights of the accused are guaranteed. This seems particularly urgent, given comments made by Hardiman J. in a prohibition application in April 2008:
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